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HINTERLAND 
The voyage that this book is a reflection of started in the late 1970s 
when I was studying for an MA in English and American literature. In those 
days, the teaching staff at Utrecht University, the Netherlands, consisted of 
a mix of staunch defenders of New Criticism and early adepts of 
narratology, post-colonialism and deconstruction, a combination that often 
left us students baffled as we oscillated between memorising metaphysical 
poetry and excavating texts for hidden, ideological meanings. These 
methodologies generated in me an acute interest in what people do to and 
with language. When I began my legal education, I was driven by the idea 
that law is what people do to one another by means of language. But 
disappointment awaited. Rule-oriented courses were the main staple. 
                                                             
 
1  Anamorphosis is grateful for this one-time permission of Edinburgh University Press to 
publish the “Introduction” of Jeanne Gaakeer's new book: Judging from Experience. 
Law, Praxis, Humanities. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2019 
(https://edinburghuniversitypress.com/book-judging-from-experience.html). 
 The formatting of the original publication was maintained (Editor's note). 
2  Professor of Jurisprudence: Hermeneutical and Narrative Foundations at Erasmus School 
of Law. Rotterdam, Netherlands. E-mail: gaakeer@law.eur.nl.  
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Where were the people to whom the rules applied? What did it mean to 
apply a rule? What did one actually do when one said one did? What view 
on language was there behind the notion of rule application? No answers 
were given, simply because such questions did not matter much. However, 
when I took courses in legal philosophy and the history of ideas of law – 
revealingly called, as they still are today, metajuridica – I understood that 
the reflective methodology of the humanities had its place in law.  
This formative moment caused a shift in my academic focus. While 
searching for a dissertation topic, I came across Richard Posner’s Law and 
Literature3. The book came as a double shock. The very idea of a bond 
existing between law and literature was immensely consoling, yet Posner’s 
elaboration seemed restrictive. It reduced the importance of a literary turn 
of mind for legal practice. As I continued my parallel education in law and 
literature, I experienced that in the humanities departments the topic met 
with suspicion. I was, more or less, hounded out as a traitor to the 
humanities, for we all knew that law had absolutely nothing to do with the 
postmodern study of literature, did we not? Fortunately, Erasmus School of 
Law offered me the opportunity to pursue my goal. In the works of James 
Boyd White and Richard Weisberg, the revitalisation of the two early 
twentieth-century challenges provoked by John Wigmore and Benjamin 
Cardozo4 was both aspirational and critical in nature. To me at least, these 
two lenses with which to view contemporary law and literature differed in 
degree rather than in kind. White’s thesis on the homology of law and 
literature resonated5, given the earlier unity of law and literature in the 
European context. And so did his approach to the connection between two 
disciplines as an integrated product of translation. Weisberg’s emphasis on 
an ethical view with respect to the enterprise of law and literature added to 
its importance6.  
                                                             
 
3  R. A. Posner, Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1988 [rev. eds 1998 and 2009]). 
4  J. H. Wigmore, ‘A list of legal novels’, 2 Illinois Law Review, 1908, pp. 574–93; ‘A list of 
one hundred legal novels’, 17 Illinois Law Review, 1922, pp. 26–41. B. N. Cardozo, ‘Law 
and literature’, Yale Review, 1925, pp. 489–507. 
5  J. B. White, When Words Lose Their Meaning: Constitutions and Reconstitutions of 
Language, Character, and Community (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 
xii. 
6  R. H. Weisberg, The Failure of the Word: The Protagonist as Lawyer in Modern Fiction 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984). 
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When I began to serve as a judge, this occasioned another shift in my 
thought. Only then did I realise fully the potential of what the fields of Law 
and Literature, or, more broadly, Law and the Humanities, have to offer: 
namely, the reminder that success in practising law depends to a large 
extent on developing one’s imagination, while constantly remaining alert to 
the pitfalls of our linguistic usages in relation to our own private and 
professional biases when we read and write the narratives in and of law. 
This is one of the ideas animating this book.  
When as academic jurists we turn to the humanities to further our 
interdisciplinary legal projects, I therefore suggest that we reconsider the 
alliance of theory and practice in law and jurisprudence, lest we run the risk 
of legal practice remaining unresponsive to interdisciplinary studies, and of 
students of law dismissing ‘Law and’ courses as irrelevant for the 
development of their professional skills. In short, in developing 
interdisciplinary scholarship, we should not create new academic ghettos. It 
is only through law in practice that we can learn to speak of justice. This is 
why the quid-iuris question at the heart of legal doctrine and jurisprudence 
traditionally conceived remains crucial when it comes to investigating the 
possibilities of the contribution of the humanities on the methodological 
plane. On the one hand, this speaks for attention to how legal and social 
relations are established by means of our discourse on legal meaning and 
justice. On the other hand, it ties in with the subject of the methodology of 
the legal perception of the case at hand. This is important to note, because 
the view of law as a normative set of propositions that are ‘out there’ in an 
unadulterated form, ready for our application, unfortunately remains in 
need of refutation. Because jurists are obviously trained for the purpose of 
doing law, the humanistic study of law should be a praxis, a merger of 
reflection with action. Academic research can then also have an impact of 
the kind desired so highly by its leadership.  
This brings me to another issue. I often perceive that my academic 
colleagues in law and the humanities from common law countries have 
misconceptions about civil law legal reasoning. It is supposedly a mere 
syllogistic, deductive rule application, moving from abstract, codified legal 
norms to the decision in a specific case, all in contradistinction to common 
law reasoning. The expectation raised by such a conception of rule 
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application seems to be that of an unproblematic existence and use of 
abstract norms. That notion is oversimplified, to say the least. If we start 
categorising what is to count as knowledge in the field of law, and begin 
from the premise that law is a domain of rules only, this simplification can 
lead to the marginalisation of interdisciplinary ventures based on it. 
Furthermore, it creates a false opposition between common law and civil 
law thought on the act of judging – adjudication being the most prominent 
feature of the intertwinement of theory and practice; namely, it proclaims 
for civil law jurisdictions a formalist hermeneutics. That is to say, one of 
‘outside-in’ legal reasoning, as Ronald Dworkin called it, from the abstract 
to the concrete, rather than ‘inside-out’ reasoning, with a focus on the 
judicial effort of connecting the facts of the case to the legal norms7.  
I suggest that it is on the plane sketched above that the humanities 
can, firstly, help elucidate the problems connected to this type of 
misunderstanding, and, secondly, contribute to their possible solution. That 
is why I turn to philosophical hermeneutics, especially as developed by the 
French philosopher Paul Ricoeur. I aim to draw a blueprint of what the 
humanities can contribute to the realm of praxis by bringing to the fore the 
resources that can contribute to the judge’s development of her professional 
quality of phronèsis: namely, practical wisdom. The view behind my 
enterprise is that, despite their differences, most legal systems share core 
values such as judicial impartiality, consistency and integrity, which, not 
incidentally, are considered virtues in the Aristotelian sense. 
Methodological reflections on the determination of the facts of a case, the 
judicial justification of deliberative choices made, and the way in which law 
establishes relations between people are therefore shared tasks.  
A PRAGMATIC APPROACH  
Since the days of Quintilian, law students have been taught to argue 
both sides of the case, the method of the controversiae. My perhaps not so 
humble proposal therefore is to cherish the old legal adages of 
interpretation diversi sed non adversi (different, but not contrary)8 and 
                                                             
 
7  R. Dworkin, Justice in Robes (Cambridge, MA and London: Belknap Press, 2006), p. 54. 
8  The term ‘different, but not contrary’, or its equivalent diversum sed non contrarium 
(‘different, but not conflicting’) was used in medieval law and theology to show that texts 
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eadem sed aliter (the same, but differently) to help Law and Literature 
continue to thrive worldwide. Law and Literature offers wonderful 
opportunities for a methodology that can renew the legal pedagogy of close 
reading and sharing a text, responding to it with the generosity of an open 
mind, and engaging in dialogue with those whose perspectives are informed 
by other notions and experiences. In Europe as well, the humanistic study 
of law has regained momentum. This inspires me to return to various 
aspects of text, language, and narrative discussed in Law and Literature, in 
order to investigate new possibilities for contributions to legal practice.  
My views are obviously informed and influenced by the context of my 
legal education, and my work as an academic and a judge in a European 
civil law system, and within it, the field of criminal law. However, I do not 
intend to promote forms of parochialism along the lines of continent. Being 
the nomad that I am, I hope that it is not professional arrogance that 
compels me to opt for a focus on the judicial perspective9. The pragmatic 
reason for doing so – the ancient Greek word πραγματικος referring to one 
skilled in law – is why not try to turn to profit what one thinks one knows? 
Books on the act of judging are not seldom written by academics with no 
actual, visceral experience of the sublime, or rather the terrible, 
responsibility of the judge: namely, what it means to have a fellow human 
being right in front of you across the bench, and being the one assigned the 
duty to decide about his or her fate.  
Firmly rooted as I still am in the notion of law as text, and of language 
as the profession’s software, I look for fundamental commonalities of law 
and literature. The double premise of this book is that law as an academic 
discipline belongs to the humanities, given its development since the 
rediscovery of the Justinian Code that is characterised by a language-
oriented, philosophical-hermeneutical perspective, and that, as a 
consequence, jurists necessarily combine the theoretical and the practical. 
Practice turns to theory for justification of new arguments, and input from 
practice is necessary to move doctrinal debates forward. Because 
                                                             
 
on a subject and their various interpretations need not be in conflict. See G. R. Evans, 
Law and Theology in the Middle Ages (London: Routledge, 2002). 
9  An honorary title bestowed on me by Greta Olson (‘De-Americanizing law-and-literature 
narratives: opening up the story’, 22 Law & Literature, 2010, pp. 338–64, p. 340). 
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hermeneutics is not merely a methodology for interpretation, but rather a 
philosophical view for a broad mode of inquiry into text and human action, 
the art of doing law in concrete cases always requires attention to the 
reciprocal relation between fact and norm.  
Given this interaction, the primary object of interpretation is always a 
combination of the narrative(s) of the facts and the relevant propositions of 
law. This necessitates attention to the effects of the narrative construction 
of the facts on the interpretation and application of the legal norm, 
substantive or procedural, both for scholarly reflection and for legal 
practice. One way to look at the importance of narrative for law is that the 
picture of reality that law orders at the moment it tells its tale resembles the 
literary rendering of a particular moment – how a world is captured in 
words. Therefore, narrative construction matters, and we should ask in 
which way does it steer the reader towards interpretation. Equally 
important is that in each casuistic account of the facts the theoretical 
knowledge of legal doctrine is necessarily confronted with the narrative 
knowledge of literature10. That makes Law and Literature essential for 
legal practice. It also suggests that jurists should bear in mind the influence 
of their own interpretive frameworks and unconscious choices or 
preferences with regard to both facts and norms. To the skeptics whom I 
hope to convince, I say that the ‘and’ of Law and Literature does not imply 
a methodologically dangerous liaison of dissimilar disciplines, but a 
fundamental relatedness.  
Another reason to turn to philosophical hermeneutics is that in legal 
theory as well as in interdisciplinary legal studies the debate continues on 
whether law is part of the social sciences or firmly rooted in the humanities. 
Any stand we take here is important when it comes to discussing the future 
of such broader fields as Law and the Humanities or Law and Culture and 
their critical functions. My point is that it will simply not do for law to lump 
together the empirically inclined ‘Law ands’ with the language-based 
varieties. I conceive jurisprudence to be contextual knowledge of law. This 
requires the ability to enter imaginatively into any given situation. As a 
practical skill of knowing what a situation amounts to, and what it requires 
                                                             
 
10  R. Foqué and A. C. ’t Hart, Instrumentaliteit en rechtsbescherming (Arnhem: Gouda 
Quint, 1990), p. 369. 
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in terms of judicial action, it benefits from what the humanities have to 
offer by way of insight into different aspects of humanity. That is another 
idea animating this book.  
THE ROADMAP  
This book is divided into three parts. Part I takes as its overarching 
topic the enchantment of knowledge in law. Chapter 1 discusses Gustave 
Flaubert’s eponymous clerks Bouvard and Pécuchet to illustrate the result 
of a process of differentiation of knowledge culminating in the positivist 
thought of the nineteenth century. It serves as the blueprint for the book as 
a whole. Chapters 2 and 3 take the return road to the ‘nooks and crannies’ − 
as the epigraph to this book calls them − of the language of law, not out of 
nostalgia for the halcyon days of the unity of law and the humanities, but to 
show what brought us where we are now. Chapter 2 offers a short overview 
of the processes of differentiation in law and jurisprudence – from the unity 
brought about by the rediscovery of the Corpus Iuris Civilis in the eleventh 
century to the rise of national legal systems culminating in the nineteenth 
century, and from law as an autonomous discipline to ‘Law ands’ in the 
twentieth century – in order to provide a small map of the territory from a 
historical, European perspective. Chapter 3 discusses the limits of language 
in relation to questions of determinism and volition, and asks what the 
nineteenth-century epistemological and methodological debate on the 
disciplinary character of the humanities – the Erklären-Verstehen 
controversy – means for contemporary interdisciplinary legal studies. 
Discussions of Robert Musil’s novel The Man without Qualities and the 
Dutch poet Gerrit Achterberg’s Acid poems in Chapters 4 and 5 illuminate 
how the theoretical considerations of Chapters 1 to 3 have literary 
counterparts.  
Against this background, Part II turns to iuris prudentia, insightful 
knowledge of law. It provides the building blocks for a humanistic model for 
doing law. Chapter 6 elaborates on the importance of practical knowledge, 
phronèsis, when it comes to combining facts and norms. On the basis of the 
works of Aristotle and Ricoeur, it discusses the distinction between 
theoretical and practical knowledge, and offers an analysis of phronèsis as 
the disposition that takes its deliberations from the circumstances of things. 
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As such, it forms the basis for a proposal to incorporate philosophical 
hermeneutics in law, both in theory and in practice. Chapter 7 addresses the 
uses of metaphor in law. It asks in what way does metaphor help spark new 
meaning, and in what way can it hold us captive and make us fall into the 
trap of cognitive dissonance, confirmation bias and belief perseverance. 
Chapter 8 asks after the requirements of judicial narrative intelligence. It 
introduces the topic of empathy, and analyses the way in which mimesis as 
re-presentation of human action works in law and in literature. Finally, it 
connects these topics to a right discrimination of the equitable. Pat Barker’s 
Regeneration illustrates the argument by connecting the topic of voice to 
(in)justice. The interconnections of law and narrative are the topic of 
Chapters 9 and 10. They consider the possibility of a legal narratology and 
the form(s) it could take, firstly by focusing on the topics of probability, 
coherence, and plot in law and literature and, secondly, by turning to the 
implications of a narratological approach for criminal law in practice. John 
Coetzee’s Disgrace exemplifies the issues that Chapter 10 raises.  
Part III deals with what Benjamin Cardozo called the perplexities of 
judges that become the scholar’s opportunity, again a connection of theory 
and practice in law. With Ian McEwan’s The Children Act, Chapter 11 
returns to the topic of empathy. Because narratives can trigger empathic 
and emotional responses in various ways, it asks what the cognitive turn in 
narratology means for the judge who deals with the emotions and 
narratives of others. By way of conclusion as to why Law and Literature 
matters deeply for legal practice, Part III also goes to ‘the suburbs’, as the 
epigraph has it, and to the dystopic effects of technology unbridled by just 
law. Chapter 12 focuses on DNA biotechnology by means of a reading of 
Michel Houellebecq’s Atomised, combined with Martin Heidegger’s view on 
technology. Finally, in Chapter 13, issues of privacy and freedom in 
connection with the consequences of artificial and ambient intelligence in 
law are raised by turning to Juli Zeh’s The Method. Both chapters ask how 
new technologies affect the constitution of the human self, and consider 
what influences an instrumental use of technology can have on selfhood, on 
legal personhood, and on our ability to narrate ourselves, in law and 
elsewhere.  
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While in one sense this book reflects my parallel education and 
career, partisan as that may be, at the same time it hopes to offer some food 
for thought for a continued discussion on interdisciplinary research, and 
guidance for judicial self-reflection, or at least suggestions for wonderful 
reading. Mine is not a grand theory of law and literature, but an attempt – 
an essay as Montaigne used the term – to show that their combined study 
in Law and Literature is best viewed as the intertwined snakes portrayed 
on Hermes’s caduceus, symbolic of the negotiation of meaning: in concord. 
At the end of this prefatory chapter, this would probably be the place to 
offer, in truly juridical fashion, a few disclaimers on terminology or on what 
lies beyond the scope of this book − and that is a great deal. One trigger 
warning suffices: this book offers perhaps an idealistic view that policy-
oriented jurists find hard to swallow. But since Aristotle advised us to start 
‘by wondering that things are as they are’11, they, as well as my other 
readers, who I hope will prove to be the Maecenases of this book, have to 
find out for themselves.  
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